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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK RIGGLE and GENEVA H. 
RIGGLE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
DAINES I\IANUF ACTURING 
CO:MP ANY, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10948 
PETITION FO·R REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The purpose of this case is to determine whether or 
not the Defendant-Appellant is liable for the balance 
due on its promissory note in favor of the Plaintiffs-
Respondents. 
DISPOSITION BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
rrhe Utah Supreme Court, by decision filed March 
20, 1968, reversed and remanded for further proceedings 
the Summary Judgment granted March 28, 1967, by Salt 
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Lake County District Court in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
Respondents for the amount due on the promissory note 
including interest, attorney's fees, and Court costs. ' 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek to have the Court re- ' 
consider its decision and conform the same to the 
admitted facts and law applicable to this ca.se. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the brief of the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents on file with this Court is incor-
porated herein by this reference. 
Certain essential and salient facts are misstated in 
the Court's opinion and other facts that were admitted 
have not been given consideration in such opinion. Fur-
ther facts have been assumed which are not supported 
by the record. Therefore, certain of the facts in the 
instant case are restated and reviewed. 
1. The partnership consisted of four members and 
was organized in early 1954 (R-36). 
2. The Corporation was organized in early 1955 and 
had in excess of ten incorporators (Respondents' Brief-
3). 
3. The employment contract that gave rise to the 
note was executed over five months after the incorpora-
tion of the Defendant (R-13) . 
. ,
"" 
4. The Corporation did not assume the $10,000.00 
obligation of the partnership. (Please take judicial 
notice of Case No. 155799, Salt Lake District Court Salt 
' Lake County, wherein the Plaintiff herein has sued the 
partnership, and each member, for the unpaid $10,000.00 
note. rrhe Corporation is not a party Defendant, nor has 
it been intcrplead by the Defendant partners). 
Please noie that there are no agreements, deeds, 
rhoses of action, or otherwise between the Plaintiff, 
Riggle, and the Defendant Corporation other than the 
promissory note here sued on and subject of this action. 
ARGUMENT 
In order to properly address an argument to this 
case, it is ne-cessary to analyze some of the confusing 
statements in the Court's opinion. The Court stated that 
the Defendant had claimed that Mr. Riggle lacked quali-
fications to render service. The employment agreement 
is in the record (R-13). The agreement, which is signed 
by the Corporation's president, and admitted genuine by 
the pleadings, states that Mr. Riggle had several years 
of experience in business management and metal engi-
neering. The statement, which is signed by the Corpora-
tion, has not been contested by the Corporation. Further, 
in the a.ffidavit of Darrel R. Daines, President of the 
Corporation, he states that, ''The Plaintiff Frank Riggle 
was to furnish business and engineering consultation as 
a way of justifying his employment" (R-19). 
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Please note that the employment contract required 
Mr. Riggle to be available on demand and that there iR 
no claim that he ever refused to render service. 
The entire argument in relation to whether or not 
.Mr. Riggle rendered services is moot, irrelevant, anti 
immaterial, for the Corpora1tion's contract with Mr. 
Riggle was merged into a promissory note, the contract 
terminated, and the note represents the total obligation 
between the parties. 
In the opinion the Court states, '' ... the members 1 
of the partnership organized the defendant corpora-
tion ... '' This statement contains only half truths, for 
the Defendants were merely some of the parties who 
organized the Corporation that had more 1than ten incor-
porators. A completely new legal entity was crnated and 
the ownership thereof was entirely changed (Respond-
ents' Brief-3). 
The Court further states, ''After its incorporation 
the defendant assumed the obligations of the partner-
ship, including the note and the employment contract." 
This stafoment is entirely unsupported by the record. 
It is also untrue. The Corporation did not at any time 
assume the $10,000.00 note. The only statement that is 
even slightly evidentiary in this matter would he the 
statement of Mr. Daines in his Affidavit to the extent 
that, "It was agreed that both the note and employment 
contract would become obligations of the Corporation 
when the Corporation organization was completed" (R-
19). This statement was made in relation to the trans-
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action that took effect before the Corporation was or-
ganized and is not even evidence of what the Corporation 
did after it was organized. 
In speculation, it is difficult to imagine what type 
of valid consideration would support the Corporation's 
assumption of a $10,000.00 debt in a situation where the 
Corporation did not receive any benefit from the assump-
tion. Please note that the entire $10,000.00 had been 
ginn to the partnership many months before the Cor-
poration was organized. 
'l'he Court, in its second paragraph, indicates that 
the defendant corporation claimed that the employment 
contract was an inducement to make the loan to the 
partnership and a device to avoid the usury law. It is 
absolutely, factually, legally, and logically impossible to 
ort ~· these statements ! How, by any stretch of the 
imagination, could an employment contract between a 
corporntion and the Plaintiff that arose 11 months and 
22 days after the loan of $10,000.00 to a partnership, be 
an inducement to loan the money ·to the partnership. It 
may be presumptuous to ref er the Supreme Court to a 
dictionary for a definition of the word inducement, so 
\\'e merely refer the Court to the word and call its atten-
tion to the effect that an inducement must antidate, not 
postdate, the thing it induces. 
Mr. Riggle had no economic leverage on the Cor-
poration prior to the time the Corporation executed an 
employment contract with him. Even if the Corporation 
had assumed prior debts or employment agreements, this 
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would be a unilateral assumption and not enforceable by 
Riggle without new consideration passing from the Cor. 
poration to him and no such consideration is alleged or 
implied in the record. 
The Corporation entered into an employment con. 
tract requiring the Plaintiff to render services at their 
demand. The employment contract was terminated and 
the promissory note issued in substitution therefor. 
Even though it is not necessary that the original 
obligation which is discharged by the novation be valid, 
(Williston on Contracts, Volume 6, Section 1872, pages 
52-58), in the case before the Court the original obliga-
tion was valid in every sense of the word, for the Cor-
poration voluntarily executed the employment agreement 
with Mr. Riggle under circumstances where there could 
not have been any legal or financial reason motivating 
the Corporation to execute the employment agreement. 
The Court stated that one of the issues would be 
lack of consideration for the note. Since a peppercorn 
is adequate consideration, certainly the cancellation of a 
contraet requiring monthly payment and forgiveness of 
an accruing obligation containing additional years of 
performance is legal consideration. 
If the Plaintiff's services under the contract were 
not adequate or performed in accordance with the terms 
of the contract, these would have been matters that would 
have given the Corporation the right to terminate the 
contract for cause. We do not know why the Corpora· 
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tion terminated the contract, but we do know it was ter-
minated and that the Corporation then acknowledged a 
past-due indebtedness and confirmed such indebtedness 
with a promissory note. There is no quesHon of fact as 
to the consideration for the note. 
'l'he Supreme Court states that a question of fact is 
the legality of the obligation. I am certain this Court is 
familiar with the laws relating to negotiable instruments 
and promissory notes. Defendants have admitted the 
genuineness of the promissory note. If the note is genu-
ine, how is it possible for the note to be illegal. There 
is no allegation that it \vas issued in violation of any 
statute 01· any la:w. To the contrary, the facts show that 
even assuming the Defendant's claim of usury in con-
nection with the $10,000.00 promissory note issued by a 
partnership at a time prior to the existence of the Cor-
poration was true, nevertheless this transaction did not 
possibly, legally, logically, morally, or in any other way 
taint a transaction occurring after the date of the sup-
posed usurious transaction and between different parties 
and for different purposes. It is simply not logically 
possible for this agreement between the Plaintiff and a 
corporation which was not even existing at the time a 
usurious contract was claimed to have been executed to 
have been an inducement to or usury for the loan which 
had been completed over a year before the contract came 
into being. 
\Ve should like to further point out that whether or 
not services were renden~d under the contract is now 
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both immaterial and irrelevant to this cause for the fol-
lowing reasons : 
1. The contrac.t required performance only at the 
request of the Corporation. 
2. It is not alleged that Plaintiff ever refused a 
request of the Corporation. 
3. The contract was terminated and m lieu of the 
contract a promissory note was executed which is the 
subjcet of the action before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
In couelusion your Petitioner would like to again 
indic.ate the simplicity of this action and the issues 
before the Court. Since this Corporation was not even 
an existing thing at the time the usurious transaction 
was claimed to have occurred, it could not have been a 
party nor can it claim to be even connected to the allegetl 
usurious transaction. Is there never an end to contro-
versy~ Should not this Court support settlement to giYe 
some finality to transactions between citizens? 
, Respec nlly suhmit~ted .,. 
. ,~/ ~~ 
. I E, J~NE & . i\1uR"P'trY 
and -w .. JEFFERY FILLMORE 
117 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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